Limits of Coastal State Enforcement Jurisdiction in the EEZ: The M/V Saiga (No. 2) Case

The M/V Saiga (No. 2) Case stands as a cornerstone in the interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). At its heart lies the tension between the enforcement powers of coastal states and the principle of freedom of navigation.¹

Coastal states enjoy sovereign rights in their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). However, UNCLOS deliberately restricts enforcement jurisdiction in the EEZ to prevent unilateral expansion of coastal state authority that could undermine the stability of international navigation.²

On the other hand, freedom of navigation is a foundational principle of the law of the sea. It ensures that vessels of all nations may traverse and operate beyond territorial waters without undue interference. This freedom is safeguarded by the doctrine of exclusive flag-state jurisdiction, which prevents coastal states from exercising general enforcement powers over foreign vessels in the EEZ or on the high seas.³

The Saiga case is significant because it clarified these limits. It reaffirmed that while coastal states may regulate certain activities in their maritime zones, they cannot apply their laws in ways that restrict navigation or undermine the rights of other states.⁴

Factual Background

The dispute arose in October 1997 when Guinean authorities intercepted the tanker M/V Saiga, registered under Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The vessel was engaged in bunkering operations, supplying fuel to fishing vessels outside the territorial sea of Guinea. Guinea alleged that the tanker had violated its customs laws by providing fuel without authorization.

Guinean patrol boats pursued the Saiga, fired upon it during the chase, and eventually arrested the vessel and detained its multinational crew. The incident was notable not only for the legal questions it raised but also for its operational context: bunkering is a common practice in international waters, yet Guinea treated it as an infringement of its domestic regulatory regime.

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines immediately protested, arguing that Guinea’s actions violated UNCLOS provisions on jurisdiction and freedom of navigation. The flag state emphasized that the vessel was operating outside Guinea’s territorial waters, in the EEZ, where Guinea’s enforcement powers were limited.

The case was brought before ITLOS, marking one of the Tribunal’s earliest opportunities to interpret UNCLOS in a contentious enforcement setting. The facts made the dispute a test case for defining the boundaries of coastal state authority under international law.⁵

Legal Issues

The ITLOS was asked, among others, to determine:

• Whether Guinea could enforce its customs laws in the EEZ.
• Whether the arrest and detention of the vessel were lawful under UNCLOS.
• Whether the requirements for lawful hot pursuit were satisfied.
• Whether the use of force was lawful under international law.⁶

Applicable Laws

The Tribunal relied on several key provisions of UNCLOS to resolve the dispute:

• Article 56 outlines the rights of coastal states in the EEZ, focusing on the exploration, exploitation, and management of natural resources. These rights are specific and do not extend to general enforcement of domestic laws.⁷

• Article 58 preserves the freedoms of navigation and overflight in the EEZ, rights enjoyed by all states. These freedoms are essential to maintaining global trade and maritime mobility.⁸

• Article 92 establishes the principle of exclusive flag‑state jurisdiction on the high seas. Ships are subject only to the authority of their flag state once they leave territorial waters.⁹

• Article 111 sets strict conditions for lawful hot pursuit. Pursuit must begin within zones where the coastal state has valid jurisdiction and must be continuous.¹⁰

Arguments of the Parties

• Saint Vincent and the Grenadines argued that Guinea lacked jurisdiction to enforce customs laws in the EEZ and that bunkering activities did not fall within coastal state regulatory authority. It emphasized that the arrest violated freedom of navigation and flag‑state jurisdiction.¹¹
• Guinea contended that bunkering interfered with its fisheries and customs regime, justifying enforcement. It claimed its pursuit and seizure were consistent with hot pursuit doctrine and necessary to protect its maritime interests.¹²

Tribunal’s Decision

ITLOS ruled that Guinea’s actions were unlawful under UNCLOS. The Tribunal held that Guinea had no authority to apply its customs laws in the EEZ, since coastal state jurisdiction in that zone is limited to resource‑related matters and does not extend to general enforcement of domestic legislation.¹³

The Tribunal also determined that the requirements for lawful hot pursuit were not satisfied. Pursuit must begin while the vessel is within a maritime zone where the coastal state has enforcement jurisdiction, and it must be continuous. In this case, the Saiga was outside Guinea’s territorial sea and EEZ when the chase began, rendering the pursuit invalid.¹⁴

Furthermore, ITLOS affirmed that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, as the flag state, had standing to bring claims for damages suffered by the vessel and crew. This reinforced the principle of flag‑state protection as a cornerstone of international maritime law. Guinea was ordered to pay compensation for the unlawful arrest, detention, and use of force against the vessel and crew.¹⁵

The Tribunal also addressed the proportionality of force, noting that the use of force must be avoided as far as possible. Where force is unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. Considerations of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as they do in other areas of international law. The Tribunal finds that Guinea’s use of force against the Saiga was not reasonable or necessary. Firing at the Saiga to disable it endangered human life and was a disproportionate use of force.¹⁶

Legal Principles Established

The case clarified several important principles:

1. Exclusive Flag‑State Jurisdiction: Ships on the high seas are subject only to the jurisdiction of their flag state. This protects freedom of navigation and prevents coastal states from extending their domestic laws beyond territorial waters.¹⁷
2. Strict Hot Pursuit Doctrine: Hot pursuit must begin lawfully within zones of valid jurisdiction, be continuous, and be clearly communicated to the pursued vessel. Any deviation invalidates the pursuit. The Tribunal’s strict interpretation ensures that coastal states cannot use hot pursuit as a pretext for extraterritorial enforcement.¹⁸

This principle is explored further in the “Hot Pursuit at Sea: International Law, UNCLOS, and Case Lessons.” https://juriswarrior.com/hot-pursuit-at-sea-unclos-case-lessons/

3. Limited Coastal State Enforcement in the EEZ: Coastal states have sovereign rights over natural resources in the EEZ but cannot apply customs or unrelated domestic laws extraterritorially. This limitation preserves the balance between coastal state interests and the freedom of all nations to use international waters.¹⁹
4. Proportionality in the Use of Force: Enforcement actions at sea must comply with international standards of necessity and proportionality. Excessive or indiscriminate use of force, such as firing upon a bunkering vessel, violates both UNCLOS and broader principles of international law. This doctrine provides operational guidance for lawful interceptions.²⁰

Conclusion

The Saiga case drew a firm line between what coastal states can and cannot do in the EEZ. By ruling Guinea’s enforcement unlawful, the Tribunal protected navigation freedoms but also exposed a gap: states face real challenges in dealing with bunkering, smuggling, or illegal fishing, yet UNCLOS gives them limited tools.

The decision serves as a reminder that enforcement actions must be grounded in clear legal authority. Hot pursuit must follow strict conditions, and excessive force risks international responsibility. The ruling encourages reliance on cooperative mechanisms, regional agreements, port‑state controls, and joint patrols, rather than unilateral enforcement.

Decades later, the principles from Saiga remain highly relevant. Disputes in the South China Sea, Gulf of Guinea, and Strait of Hormuz continue to raise questions about jurisdiction and navigation rights. The case serves as a reference point for balancing coastal state interests with freedom of navigation.

The Case stands as a doctrinal affirmation of the primacy of international law in regulating maritime enforcement. By clarifying the limits of coastal state jurisdiction and condemning disproportionate use of force, the Tribunal reinforced that navigation rights are safeguarded not by unilateral assertion but by adherence to the collective framework of UNCLOS and general international law. The case underscores that maritime governance must be grounded in cooperative mechanisms, that enforcement measures must conform to necessity and proportionality, and that the oceans, beyond national jurisdiction, must remain secure, open, and free for all states.

Footnotes

1. M/V Saiga (No. 2), ITLOS Case No. 2, Judgment, July 1, 1999 (hereinafter M/V Saiga (No. 2)]. ↩︎
2. UNCLOS, art. 56. ↩︎
3. UNCLOS, art. 58. ↩︎
4. UNCLOS, arts. 87. ↩︎
5. M/V Saiga (No. 2), ¶¶ 31–39. ↩︎
6. M/V Saiga (No. 2), ¶¶ 31–39. ↩︎
7. UNCLOS, art. 56. ↩︎
8. UNCLOS, art. 58. ↩︎
9. UNCLOS, art. 92. ↩︎
10. UNCLOS., art. 111. ↩︎
11. M/V Saiga (No. 2), ¶¶ 110, 127, 136. ↩︎
12. Id., ¶¶ 116, 142. ↩︎
13. Id., ¶¶ 127, 136. ↩︎
14. Id., ¶¶ 139–152. ↩︎
15. Id., ¶¶ 176–177. ↩︎
16. Id., ¶¶ 153–159. ↩︎
17. Id., ¶¶ 81–85. ↩︎
18. Id., ¶¶ 153–159. ↩︎
19. Id., ¶¶ 131–136 ↩︎
20. M/V Saiga (No. 2), ¶¶ 153–159; UNCLOS, art. 301; U.N. Charter art. 2(4), art. 51 ↩︎